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SELF-INCRIMINATION: ARE UNDERLYING QUESTIONS 
ABOUT A PENDING CONVICTION ON APPEAL A VIOLATION 
OF A DEFENDANT’S FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION? 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK  
People v. Cantave
1
 
(decided June 25, 2013) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
(the “Privilege”) has been a staple of our constitution since its incep-
tion.  It continues to protect witnesses who are called involuntarily 
for the purpose of testifying against themselves and from answering 
questions that may serve to accomplish the same.2  This Privilege was 
the result of “centuries of persecution and struggle” our forefathers 
faced in forming this Union.3  Chief Justice Marshall stated that cer-
tain basic rights, including the Privilege, are secure “for ages to 
come, and . . . designed to approach immortality as nearly as human 
institutions can approach it.”4  This Privilege extends to all areas of 
justice, including both criminal and civil proceedings where a witness 
may subject himself to criminal culpability, and it applies to not only 
a defendant party, but also to any witness.5 
This case note explores the expansiveness of the Privilege.  
 
1 993 N.E.2d 1257 (N.Y. 2013). 
2 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966). 
4 Id. (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 387 (1821)). 
5 Turley, 4141 U.S. at 77 (quoting McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924)); 
[T]he privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the pro-
ceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used.  It applies alike 
to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to 
subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it.  The privilege pro-
tects a mere witness as fully as it does who is also a party defendant. 
Id. 
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Specifically, this case note addresses the issue presented in People v. 
Cantave—whether a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self incrimination is violated when the court allows the cross-
examination of the defendant about underlying facts of a prior con-
viction that is on direct appeal.6  Case law supports that, under such 
circumstances, the defendant’s Privilege was violated. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Jean Cantave was charged with assault in the second degree 
and assault in the third degree.7  The alleged assault occurred during a 
confrontation outside Cantave’s place of business.8  The only parties 
present during the confrontation were Cantave, complainant Andre 
Elbrisius, and the complainant’s wife.9  Prior to the alleged assault, 
Elbresius gave Cantave a ride in his car.10  During the car ride, 
Cantave and Elbresius argued about Cantave’s “unauthorized use of 
Elbresius’ spare license plate.”11  When they arrived at Cantave’s 
place of business, the argument escalated, and the alleged assault oc-
curred.12  Elbresius claimed that Cantave attacked him, but he did not 
retaliate.13  More specifically, he claimed that Cantave pushed and bit 
Elbresius’s ear and finger, causing injuries which resulted in 
Elbresius needing surgery.14  Cantave claimed that Elbresius instigat-
ed the confrontation when Elbresius hit Cantave in the face with a 
gun—a fact that was reported to the operator during the 911 emer-
gency call placed by Elbresius.15 
Defense counsel’s initial strategy was to argue that Cantave 
was justified in his actions because Elbresius had a gun.
16
  Defense 
counsel planned to establish this defense through testimony that 
would have been elicited by using Cantave as a witness.17  However, 
 
6 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1260. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1260. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1260. 
17 Id. 
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pursuant to the court’s decision after a Sandoval hearing, the People 
were granted permission to question Cantave on cross-examination 
about the underlying facts of Cantave’s recent rape conviction, facts 
which were still pending on direct appeal.18  After the defense rested, 
without calling Cantave as a witness, it renewed its objection to the 
court’s Sandoval ruling.19  Defense counsel argued that the appeal of 
the rape conviction was still pending and if the witness was forced to 
answer questions concerning the rape conviction and the underlying 
facts, he might incriminate himself, thereby violating his Privilege.20  
Defense counsel’s objection was denied and, as a result, Cantave was 
convicted of assault in the second and third degree.21  Shortly after 
Cantave’s assault conviction, his rape conviction was reversed due to 
ineffective assistance of counsel when Cantave’s prior attorney failed 
to use vital hospital records to impeach the complainant.22 
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, af-
firmed the assault conviction.23  The court ruled that the Sandoval is-
sue was not properly preserved and that even if it had been properly 
preserved, the admission of the underlying facts to the rape convic-
tion was not an abuse of the trial judge’s discretion.24  The defendant 
then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.25 
The Court of Appeals quickly addressed the Sandoval issue, 
ruling that it had, indeed, been properly preserved.26  The court rea-
soned that the objection was preserved because defense counsel re-
newed its objection at trial after it had rested but before either side 
made closing remarks, informed the court that the rape conviction 
was under appeal, and argued that Cantave’s Privilege had been vio-
 
18 Id.  Sandoval hearings were established to determine the scope of the prosecutions 
cross-examination regarding specific prior criminal, vicious, and immoral acts in the event 
the defendant chooses to take the stand.  People v. Sandoval, 314 N.E.2d 413, 418 (N.Y. 
1974). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1260. 
22 Id. (citing People v. Cantave, 921 N.Y.S.2d 278, 280 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2011)). 
23 Id. (citing People v. Cantave, 941 N.Y.S.2d 163, 164 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012)). 
24 Cantave, 941 N.Y.S.2d at 164 (“[F]elony conviction was relevant to the issues of his 
credibility because it demonstrated his willingness to put his own self interests above those 
of society.”) (citing People v. Bennette, 436 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (N.Y. 1982) (noting that the 
defendant in this case was asked questions about a conviction that was not on appeal)). 
25 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1261. 
26 Id. 
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lated.27  The trial court retained the ability to change its ruling at the 
time the objection was renewed; therefore, the objection was pre-
served and the Court of Appeals addressed the Sandoval issue on its 
merits.28 
III. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS IN PEOPLE V. CANTAVE 
The particular issue before the New York Court of Appeals is 
one of first impression.  The Privilege, however, is an area of the law 
that the New York Court of Appeals has addressed many times be-
fore.  The court has recognized that “a defendant who elects to testify 
places his credibility at issue and may generally be cross-examined 
about past criminal or immoral acts that bear upon his credibility, ve-
racity, or honesty.”29  However, the court later held that a defendant 
does not automatically waive his Privilege when his past criminal his-
tory involves a pending criminal charge.30 
In Cantave, the court discussed People v. Betts,31 a case that 
shared a similar fact pattern to that in Cantave.32  In Betts, the de-
fendant was charged with rape.33  During a pretrial Sandoval hearing, 
defense counsel attempted to preclude the People from cross-
examining the defendant, Betts, about a pending burglary charge.34  
Counsel argued that forcing Betts to answer the questions would vio-
late his Privilege.35  The trial court allowed the questioning, but the 
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “prosecution may not cross-
examine a defendant about a pending, unrelated criminal matter for 
the purpose of impeaching his credibility.”36  The court in Betts was 
concerned that by allowing the prosecution to cross-examine a de-
fendant on a pending, unrelated charge for the purposes of attacking 
 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. (citing Bennett, 593 N.E.2d at 279). 
30 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1261 (citing People v. Betts, 514 N.E.2d 865, 865 (N.Y. 1987)). 
31 514 N.E.2d 865 (N.Y. 1987). 
32 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1261. 
33 Betts, 514 N.E.2d at 865. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 865-66. 
36 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1261 (“[A]llowing a defendant-witness’ credibility to be as-
sailed through the use of cross-examination concerning an unrelated pending criminal charge 
unduly compromises the defendants right to testify with respect to the case on trial, while 
simultaneously jeopardizing the correspondingly important right to incriminate oneself as to 
the pending matter.”) (quoting Betts, 514 N.E.2d at 868). 
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 30 [2014], No. 4, Art. 15
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/15
2014] SELF-INCRIMINATION 1143 
the defendant’s credibility it would severely limit the defendant’s 
right to defend himself when weighed against his Privilege.37 
Cantave urged the court to extend the Betts holding to include 
not only a pending criminal charge but also the underlying facts of a 
conviction on appeal.38  The court agreed with Cantave for the same 
reasons and concerns that it expressed in Betts.39  The court held that 
because Cantave was continuing to pursue an appeal of his rape con-
viction as a matter of right, he continued to run the risk of self-
incrimination by answering any questions regarding the rape convic-
tion until he had “fully exhausted his right to appeal.”40 
The court reasoned that “pleading the Fifth” is in and of itself 
prejudicial in that it commonly suggests guilt.41  Further, prior hold-
ings have made it much more complicated for defendants to exercise 
their right to defend themselves by greatly limiting the Privilege.42  
These limitations complicate testifying as a defendant and risk expos-
ing the defendant’s past criminal history to the jury.43  The court also 
stated that the trial court’s Sandoval ruling in this case essentially 
prevented the defendant from testifying on his own behalf.44  More 
specifically, the court reiterated what it found in Betts when it stated 
that “being questioned about the facts underlying the previous con-
viction while it is pending appeal, ‘unduly compromises the defend-
ant’s right to testify with respect to the case on trial, while simultane-
ously jeopardizing the corresponding important right not to 
incriminate oneself as to the pending matter.’ ”45 
Finally, the New York Court of Appeals ruled in favor of 
 
37 Betts, 514 N.E.2d at 866. 
38 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1262. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. (citing Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326 (1999) (providing that “if no 
adverse consequences can be visited upon the convicted person by reason of further testimo-
ny, then there is no further incrimination to be feared.”)). 
41 Id. 
42 Id.; see also Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-56 (1958) (holding that a de-
fendant must invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to both ex-
culpatory and inculpatory questions to protect himself, or he runs the risk of waiving the 
privilege); People v. Bagby, 482 N.E.2d 41, 43 (N.Y. 1985) (citing People v. Cassidy, 107 
N.E. 714, 715 (N.Y. 1915) (“A person cannot waive his privilege under the constitutional 
provisions and give testimony to his advantage, or the advantage of his friends, and at the 
same time and in the same proceeding assert his privilege and refuse to answer questions that 
are to his disadvantage or the disadvantage of his friends.”)). 
43 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1263. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. (quoting Betts, 514 N.E.2d at 868). 
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Cantave, holding that “the prosecution may not cross-examine a de-
fendant about the underlying facts of an unrelated criminal conviction 
on appeal for the purpose of impeaching his credibility.”46  The court 
liberally construed the applicability of the Privilege.47  It recognized 
that the purpose of the Privilege in our judicial system is to protect a 
defendant from incriminating himself and to provide a defendant with 
the opportunity to testify in his own defense without fear of incrimi-
nation in a separate, non-related judicial proceeding.48  Specifically, 
the court realized that allowing the prosecution to cross-examine 
Cantave about the underlying facts of his unrelated criminal convic-
tion that was still on appeal, for the purpose of impeaching his credi-
bility, had a dramatic effect on Cantave’s decision as to whether to 
testify, as well as its potential effect on future defendants’ decisions 
about testifying.49  Therefore, the court in Cantave reversed the trial 
court decision to allow questions pertaining to defendant’s ongoing 
conviction on appeal. 
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
The Privilege has continually evolved throughout the history 
of the United States but maintains a deep-rooted purpose within our 
constitutional rights.  The founders created the Privilege, so that “no 
person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”50  The Supreme Court of the United States recognizes the 
need to protect defendants from being involuntarily called to testify 
against themselves and answerpotentially incriminating questions.51  
In Counselman v. Hitchcock,52 the Supreme Court held that the intent 
of the Privilege was to “insure that a person should not be compelled, 
when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony 
which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime.”53 
 
 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 1261 (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)). 
48 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1263 (citing Turley, 414 U.S. at 77). 
49 Id. at 1263 (citing Betts, 514 N.E.2d at 868). 
50 Turley, 414 U.S. at 77 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V) (providing in pertinent part: 
“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). 
51 Turley, 414 U.S. at 77. 
52 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
53 Id. at 562. 
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A. Federal Construction of the Privilege and 
Limitations Placed upon It 
The United States Supreme Court has placed many limitations 
on the Privilege over the past century.  For example, in Brown v. 
United States,54 the defendant was accused of being a member of the 
Communist Party and charged for fraudulently obtaining citizen-
ship.55  She was called to testify by the prosecution.56  The defendant 
did not invoke her Privilege prior to taking the stand.57  On the stand, 
the defendant testified that she was part of a communist group but not 
during the period in question, and she refused to answer any ques-
tions pertaining to her activities while a part of that communist group 
to avoid providing potentially incriminating answers.58  The defend-
ant took the stand a second time during the defense’s case-in-chief as 
a witness on her own behalf, where she was asked, on cross-
examination, by the prosecution the same questions she had refused 
to answer while she was on the stand as an adverse witness for the 
prosecution’s case-in-chief.59  The trial court held that she had 
waived her Privilege and directed her to answer the questions.60  The 
defendant refused and was held in contempt of court.61  The defend-
ant appealed the contempt charge, and, on appeal, the Court held that 
if a witness voluntarily testifies, the witness could not then attempt to 
invoke the Privilege.62  The Court reasoned that to allow defendants 
the ability to pick and choose the questions they answer would give 
defendants too much protection and unreasonably burden the prose-
cution of crimes and the court’s ability to ascertain the truth.63  Essen-
tially, the Court in Brown established that defendants must either tes-
tify about everything, or they must not testify at all. 
Several years later, in Malloy v. Hogan,64 the Court interpret-
 
54 356 U.S. 148 (1958). 
55 Id. at 149. 
56 Id. at 150. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Brown, 356 U.S. at 150-52. 
60 Id. at 152. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 155-56. 
63 Id. at 156-57 (clarifying that the mere taking of the stand alone does not waive the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but taking the stand combined with the sub-
stance of the defendant’s testimony may open him up to waiver). 
64 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
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ed the Privilege to include not only defendants in a criminal proceed-
ing, but all witnesses.65  In Malloy, the petitioner was arrested in 
Hartford, Connecticut during a gambling raid.66  He pleaded guilty to 
the criminal charge of pool selling,67 a misdemeanor, and was sen-
tenced to one year in prison.68  After serving ninety days and being 
placed on probation, the petitioner was ordered to testify by the Supe-
rior Court of Hartford County before a referee who was investigating 
the gambling activities that the petitioner was involved in.69  The pe-
titioner refused to respond to the questions because they involved the 
events “surrounding his prior arrest and conviction,” which tended to 
incriminate him; as a result, he was held in contempt.70 
In Malloy, the Court relied on the opinion in Hoffman v. Unit-
ed States.71  The Court in Hoffman held that the Privilege extends to 
“witnesses in similar federal inquiries.”72  The Court in Hoffman fur-
ther explained that the Privilege not only protects those statements 
that would help support a conviction, but it also applies to infor-
mation that would help fill a missing “link in the chain of evidence” 
that could tend to incriminate the giver of that information.73  Further, 
an implication that the information may tend to incriminate the wit-
ness need only be possible—based on the implication of the ques-
tion.74  Additionally, when conducting this test, the judge must be 
certain that the witness is mistaken as to the incriminating factors that 
an answer to a potentially injurious question may pose.75  The Court 
in Malloy, using this test and the proper standards of applying it, 
found the questions to have a tendency to be injurious to the witness 
and held that he could invoke his Privilege.76 
 
65 Id. at 11. 
66 Id. at 3. 
67 State v. Fico, 162 A.2d 697, 699 (Conn. 1960) (noting that “pool selling” is generally 
defined as “the receiving from several persons of wagers on the same event, the total sum of 
which is to be given the winners, subject ordinarily to a deduction of a commission by the 
seller of the pool.”). 
68 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 3. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 11-12; 341 U.S. 479 (1951). 
72 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 11. 
73 Id. at 11-12 (quoting Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486). 
74 Id. 
75 Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 488. 
76 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 14. 
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B. Privilege Applicable to Pending Matters Only 
Courts have consistently held that the Privilege applies only 
to pending cases or future criminal proceedings.77  This limitation 
was demonstrated in Kastigar v. United States.78  In Kastigar, the pe-
titioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United States Grand Ju-
ry.79  The prosecution believed that the petitioners would attempt to 
invoke their Privilege; so, prior to the grand jury proceeding, the 
government offered the petitioners immunity.80  The petitioners re-
jected the government’s offer and proceeded to invoke their Privi-
lege.81  They were then ordered by the Court to answer the prosecu-
tor’s question, but they refused and were held in contempt.82  Justice 
Marshall argued in his dissent that the government could compel the 
petitioners to testify so long as the immunity protected them from be-
ing used against the petitioners in any future criminal proceeding.83  
The majority believed that Justice Marshall’s dissent provided more 
protection for the criminal defendant than the Fifth Amendment did 
on its own and, therefore, held that the level of protection offered by 
the immunity need not be broader than the level of protection that is 
offered under the Privilege; rather, it need only be equal to it.84  The 
 
77 Hitchcock, 142 U.S. at 562; see also Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) 
(stating that the privilege protects a party who is compelled to answer potentially injurious 
questions by providing an accusatory statement made by a third party for fear that silence 
would infer guilt); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (stating that if a prosecu-
tor decides not to press criminal charges against a person and instead files a civil suit against 
that person, their Fifth Amendment privilege is protected). 
78 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
79 Id. at 442. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 471 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. at 453 (majority opinion); contra id. at 467-68 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that 
the Fifth amendment privilege does not allow for courts to compel a defendant to testify, and 
then allow that testimony to be used to incriminate that same defendant); 
The Fifth Amendment gives a witness an absolute right to resist interro-
gation, if the testimony sought would tend to incriminate him.  A grant 
of immunity may strip the witness of the right to refuse to testify, but on-
ly if it is broad enough to eliminate all possibility that the testimony will 
in fact operate to incriminate him.  It must put him in precisely the same 
position, vis-a-vis the government that has compelled his testimony, as 
he would have been in had he remained silent in reliance on the privi-
lege. 
Id. 
9
Drane: Self-Incrimination
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014
1148 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
Court’s decision in Kastigar made it clear that a witness is only pro-
tected by the Privilege until the potential for incrimination in either a 
pending or future criminal proceeding has been eliminated or until he 
has been provided with immunity, at which point he may be com-
pelled to testify.85   
The Court expanded the holding from Kastigar in Leftkowitz 
v. Turley
86
 by stating that, for answers to be required, the government 
must offer the level of immunity that is necessary to supplant the pro-
tection that the Privilege provides and that the government may not 
insist that an employee or contractor waive such immunity.87 
What the courts deem “pending” is also central to understand-
ing how the Privilege ought to be applied.  This was partially an-
swered in Mitchell v. United States.88  In Mitchell, the petitioner and 
twenty-two other defendants were charged with conspiracy to distrib-
ute cocaine, and the petitioner pleaded guilty to all four counts.89  
During sentencing, the petitioner was told that she would not be af-
forded the Privilege because of her guilty plea.90  The prosecution 
called forth two other defendants during the petitioner’s testimony to 
present evidence that she played a leading role in the conspiracy to 
sell and distribute drugs, a fact that the petitioner specifically denied 
when she pleaded guilty.91  The petitioner took her attorney’s advice 
by choosing not to testify.92  The judge sentenced the petitioner to a 
minimum of ten years in prison, citing her choice not to testify as a 
compelling factor of her guilt.93  The petitioner appealed the convic-
tion, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.94 
The Supreme Court disagreed with both lower courts, holding 
that the Privilege ought not to be viewed so narrowly or “entail such 
an extensive waiver of the privilege.”95  The Court determined that a 
guilty plea ought to be treated like an offer to stipulate, reasoning that 
 
85 Id. at 453, 461. 
86 414 U.S. 70 (1973). 
87 Id. at 84-85. 
88 526 U.S. 314 (1999). 
89 Id. at 317 (including one count of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of co-
caine and three counts of distributing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school or playground). 
90 Id. at 319. 
91 Id. at 318. 
92 Id. at 319. 
93 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 319. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 322. 
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a guilty plea does not pose a threat to the fact-finding process of the 
courts and that the defendant, by pleading guilty, is actually taking all 
matters out of dispute.96  Therefore, a defendant’s guilty plea does not 
waive his Privilege.97 
V. NEW YORK STATE: ADDED LIMITATIONS AND EXPANSION 
OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
New York Courts have closely followed the applicability of 
the Fifth Amendment as articulated by the federal courts.  A criminal 
defendant has the constitutional right not to be compelled to testify in 
his or her own trial.98  Further, if a criminal defendant exercises his 
right not to testify, that choice may not be used as a presumption of 
guilt against him.99  If a defendant does not exercise the right and tes-
tifies voluntarily, the defendant must be treated like any other wit-
ness.100  Originally, this meant that the accused would be forced to 
answer any and all questions that were relevant to the issue no matter 
how injurious they were.101  The New York Court of Appeals’ origi-
nal approach was to allow a defendant to either exercise the Privilege 
by not testifying or forgo the Privilege by availing himself to the 
dangers associated with testifying, but, either way, the defendant 
could not pick and choose his testimony.102  In People v. Casey,103 the 
Court of Appeals expanded this rule to include questions involving 
the testifying defendant’s past “life and conduct” to impeach his cred-
ibility.104  The Court of Appeals expanded the rule once more in Peo-
ple v. Shapiro105 to include any questions that were relative to the is-
 
96 Id. at 323. 
97 Id. at 325. 
98 People v. Tice, 30 N.E. 494, 495 (N.Y. 1892). 
99 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.10 (McKinney 1970). 
100 Tice, 30 N.E. at 496; see also Brandon v. People, 42 N.Y. 265, 268 (1870) (stating that 
the criminal defendant left her position as a defendant when she elected to testify and was, 
therefore, subject to the same rules as any other witness); Connors v. People, 50 N.Y. 240, 
242 (1872) (“[B]y consenting to be a witness in his own behalf under the statute of 1869, the 
accused subjected himself to the same rules and was called upon to submit to the same tests 
which could by law be applied to the other witnesses.”). 
101 Tice, 30 N.E. at 496. 
102 Id. 
103 72 N.Y. 393 (1878). 
104 Id. at 398-99. 
105 126 N.E.2d 559 (N.Y. 1955). 
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sue no matter how injurious to the defendant-witness.106 
The harsh traditional approach of the New York Court of Ap-
peals has since evolved, and more protection has been granted to 
criminal defendants who choose to testify.  In People v. Johnston,107 
the New York Court of Appeals held, with respect to a defendant’s 
waiver of the Privilege, that the rule, extended only to relevant mat-
ters of the charge, not collateral matters.108  That is to say, it did not 
apply to matters used merely to impeach a defendant-witness’ credi-
bility.109 
The Court of Appeals continued to narrow the waiver rule in 
People v. Sorge.110  In Sorge, the defendant was on trial for perform-
ing illegal abortions.111  The prosecution, in an attempt to merely im-
peach the defendant’s credibility, asked the defendant on cross-
examination questions concerning previous abortions.112  When the 
defendant answered the prosecution’s questions by denying the accu-
sations, the prosecution continued to delve deeper into the prior abor-
tions.113  The court held that it is not improper for a prosecuting attor-
ney to continue asking questions for which he has a good faith belief 
that the questions have a basis in fact, even though the questions were 
merely being used to impeach the defendant’s credibility.114  There-
fore, the court in People v. Betts properly recognized that the major 
factor that the court in Sorge weighed in reaching its decision was 
that the questions by the prosecution did not concern a pending crim-
inal charge;115 therefore, there was no unduly prejudicial effect on a 
pending criminal matter.116 
In Betts, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the effect 
of New York’s approach toward testifying criminal defendants who 
are questioned about the underlying facts of a pending unrelated 
 
106 Id. at 561 (forcing the defendant to answer the prosecutor’s questions about whether he 
had told anyone, including his attorney, the whereabouts of his girlfriend after the defendant 
claimed that he had been waiting for her prior to his arrest for burglary). 
107 People v. Johnston, 127 N.E. 186 (N.Y. 1920). 
108 Id. at 188. 
109 Id. 
110 93 N.E.2d 637 (N.Y. 1950). 
111 Id. at 638. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 639. 
115 Betts, 514 N.E.2d at 867. 
116 Id. 
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criminal charge.117  The defendant was charged with rape in the first 
degree.118  During a pre-trial hearing, the defendant attempted to pre-
vent any questions on cross-examination that related to an “earlier 
youthful adjudication and a pending burglary charge” based on the 
theory that the questions would be “unduly prejudicial.”119  The de-
fendant believed that if he were asked questions about those inci-
dents, he would have to exercise his Privilege, which may have an 
unduly prejudicial effect.120  The trial court disagreed and allowed 
questions about the pending burglary charge, requiring the defendant 
to answer them if he chose to take the stand.121  The New York Court 
of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that “a defendant does not, 
by testifying, automatically and generally waive the privilege against 
self-incrimination with respect to questions concerning pending unre-
lated criminal charges.”122  It agreed with the defendant’s original ar-
gument, holding that by allowing the prosecution the opportunity to 
attack the witness’s credibility on cross-examination, regarding an 
unrelated, pending criminal charge, would unduly compromise the 
defendant’s right to testify on his own behalf in the case at hand, 
while at the same time substantially limiting his right to not incrimi-
nate himself in the pending matter.123  Essentially, the court in Betts 
explained that had the defendant been forced to answer questions 
about an unrelated burglary charge during his trial for rape, he may 
have been forced to answer an incriminating question for the pending 
burglary charge, unduly prejudicing him to the jury. 
VI. PEOPLE V. CANTAVE: FEDERAL AND STATE APPLICATION 
To reiterate, the court in Cantave held that the prosecution 
should not have been allowed to question the defendant about the un-
derlying facts of an unrelated, pending rape charge during the de-
 
117 Id. at 865. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 865-66. 
120 Betts, 514 N.E.2d at 865-66. 
121 Id. at 866. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 868 (quoting EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42, p. 92 (3d ed. 
1984) (“While an accused, unlike an ordinary witness, has an option whether to testify at all, 
exacting such a [sweeping] waiver as the price of taking the stand leaves little of the right to 
testify on one’s own behalf.”). 
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fendant’s separate trial for assault.124  This holding honors the long 
held principle that a person should not be compelled to testify against 
himself when he exercises his right to give testimony in his own de-
fense.125  The Fifth Amendment provides a vast and far reaching priv-
ilege encompassing many nuances that the court must explore in or-
der to determine whether certain questions ought to be answered by 
the defendant-witness or even asked by the prosecutor to begin with.  
Courts face the challenge of balancing a defendant’s constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination in a pending matter and his right 
to testify on his own behalf in the case at trial.126  In Cantave, the de-
fendant was, essentially, forced not to testify after the trial judge 
granted the prosecution the ability to question him about his pending 
rape charge.127  If the defendant had taken the stand, the judge would 
have compelled him to answer questions, and the defendant would 
have run the risk of incriminating himself in the pending rape trial.128  
The courts must determine whether the underlying facts of the prose-
cution’s inquiry are related or unrelated, pending or final, and wheth-
er the questions are unduly prejudicial on the defendant. 
A. Related: Prior Act’s Connection to Present Action 
New York courts have continually attempted to narrow and 
define the requisite level of “relatedness” that separate matters must 
have for a defendant to be compelled to answer a potential injurious 
question while voluntarily testifying.129  In order for the prosecution 
to ask a defendant-witness questions concerning the underlying facts 
of a separate matter, that matter must be related.130  A matter is 
deemed related if it concerns an issue of the case or serves to im-
peach the credibility of the witness.131  If the matter being inquired 
about is related to the matter at hand, then regardless of how injurious 
the evidence is to the defendant, the prosecution will be allowed to 
ask the defendant-witness questions pertaining to that matter.132  If 
 
124 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1263. 
125 Hitchcock, 142 U.S. at 562. 
126 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1263. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Shapiro, 126 N.E.2d at 561. 
130 Tice, 30 N.E. at 496. 
131 Casey, 72 N.Y. at 398-99. 
132 Shapiro, 126 N.E.2d at 561.  In People v. Trybus, the defendant broke into a home and 
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the matter does not go to an issue of the case at hand, then the matter 
must go to impeaching the defendant’s credibility.133 
In Cantave, the underlying facts of the rape conviction were 
not related to the assault charge for which the defendant was on trial.  
The incidents happened separately in location and time, and involved 
different victims.  However, the two cases are related for impeach-
ment purposes.  It is well established in New York that a criminal de-
fendant may be interrogated about the “commission of other specific 
criminal or immoral acts.”134  In this case, a rape charge would likely 
be deemed a “specific criminal or immoral act”; therefore, they are 
related, for impeachment purposes, under New York law.  That is to 
say, the prosecution would be permitted, assuming the act was final, 
to question the defendant regarding the rape conviction.  While the 
court in Cantave did not directly address why it found the rape charge 
unrelated to the assault charge, the analysis would not have changed 
the outcome because the rape charge was still pending. 
B. Pending: Prior Act’s Status During Present Action 
In order for a prosecutor to inquire about the underlying facts 
of another case, the matter must be closed.135  However, if the matter 
is still pending and the issue is collateral, that is to say that the evi-
dence is being introduced for impeachment purposes and is not relat-
ed to an issue of the case, then the New York courts have firmly held 
that a defendant-witness does not automatically waive his constitu-
tional Privilege.136  In other words, the traditional rule set forth in 
Tice that a criminal defendant avails himself of all the dangers of any 
 
murdered the resident.  113 N.E. 538, 539 (1916).  While incarcerated, the defendant made 
several statements, including admissions of guilt.  Id.  The defendant claimed that the state-
ments were coerced.  Id.  He was convicted, and on appeal, he argued that the prosecutor 
made an improper reference to the defendant’s failure to deny committing the crime while 
testifying.  Id. at 540.  Defense counsel argued that the sole purpose for the defendant taking 
the stand was to describe the circumstances under which he made those statements.  Id.  The 
court held that the defendant cannot claim the right to testify, but also argue that a presump-
tion cannot be created against him when he refuses to answer questions on a matter at hand.  
Trybus, 113 N.E. at 540. 
133 Casey, 72 N.Y. at 398-99. 
134 Sorge, 93 N.E.2d at 638; see also People v. Webster, 34 N.E. 730, 733 (N.Y. 1893) 
(stating that defendants may be interrogated upon cross-examination in regard to any vicious 
or criminal acts of his life that has a bearing on his credibility as a witness). 
135 Betts, 514 N.E.2d at 867-68. 
136 Id. 
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other witness is not necessarily true anymore.137  The Court of Ap-
peals has begun to realize that if the courts were to allow prosecutors 
the opportunity to question defendant-witnesses about a pending mat-
ter, then defendants’ right to testify would be all but destroyed.138  In 
other words, a defendant’s only choice is not to testify if he knows he 
will be asked incriminating questions in another matter, regardless of 
whether he is guilty. 
The United States Supreme Court has also taken a firm stance 
on preventing defendant-witnesses from being questioned about inci-
dents concerning a pending matter.  The Supreme Court has deter-
mined that incrimination is not complete until a sentence has been 
handed down and that conviction has become final.139  Further, a wit-
ness is only protected until he no longer has the ability to incriminate 
himself, but as long as the potential for self-incrimination remains, so 
too does the privilege unless supplanted by immunity.140 
In Cantave, the court considered a new wrinkle to the issue of 
what it deems a pending matter.  The defendant was convicted of 
rape, but his conviction was still on appeal.141  Following the teach-
ings of the Supreme Court is the only logical conclusion that the New 
York Court of Appeals should have made.  Incrimination, as set forth 
in Mitchell, has not occurred because the judgment of the conviction 
has not become final.142  That is to say, the defendant in Cantave still 
had the opportunity to overturn his rape conviction on appeal, which 
is what ultimately occurred.143  Again, a witness is only protected un-
til he can no longer incriminate himself or is granted immunity in ex-
change for his testimony.144  At the time of the assault trial, it was 
still highly likely that Cantave could potentially answer a question 
with injurious testimony to the rape conviction on appeal. 
 
137 Tice, 30 N.E. at 496. 
138 Betts, 514 N.E.2d at 868. 
139 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 325-26 (quoting J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2279, p. 991 n.1 (A. 
Best ed. Supp. 1998) (“Although the witness has pleaded guilty to a crime charged but has 
not been sentenced, his constitutional privilege remains unimpaired.”). 
140 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444-45, 453. 
141 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1260. 
142 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 325-26. 
143 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1262. 
144 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 444-45, 453. 
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C. Unduly Prejudicial: Prior Act’s Effect on 
Defendant 
The greatest harm that the court must consider and protect against 
is the unduly prejudicial effect that evidence of a pending matter may 
have on a defendant.145  If the defendant is faced with the risk of incrimi-
nating himself and the prosecution’s purpose for using the unrelated, 
pending action is to impeach the witness’s credibility, then undue preju-
dice will result.146  The defendant is faced with a double-edged sword.  He 
may choose to testify, but in doing so, he may be asked questions regard-
ing the facts of a criminal act in a case that has yet to be determined.  If 
the defendant chooses to answer, any answer he provides may be used 
against him in that separate ongoing or future trial.147  If the defendant 
chooses not to answer the question and instead exercises the Privilege, as-
suming he is not compelled to answer, a juror may naturally assume that 
the defendant is hiding something.148  In essence, every time a defendant 
takes the stand and is placed in this scenario, he has no good options and 
is forced to choose between the lesser of two evils.  On the other hand, if 
the defendant chooses to take the stand and testify, then he may not be 
able to present the best defense before the court and the jury.149 
This was exactly the situation in Cantave.  The defense was plan-
ning on a justification defense.150  In order to effectively present that de-
fense, Cantave would have to testify so that he could provide the jury with 
his version of what had occurred.151  After the judge ruled that the prose-
cutor could inquire about the pending rape charge, defense counsel’s justi-
fication defense became nearly impossible to prove because Cantave 
could not testify to what happened without placing himself at risk of hav-
ing to answer potentially incriminating questions.152  Had the prosecution 
not been allowed to ask about those underlying facts, Cantave would have 
been free to testify on his own behalf.  The court in Cantave recognized 
that had the defendant been forced to testify, he would have jeopardized 
the Privilege and was, therefore, forced to limit his right to testify in order 
 
145 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1263. 
146 Betts, 514 N.E.2d at 868. 
147 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1263; see also Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 325 (involving fear of fu-
ture incrimination). 
148 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1262. 
149 Betts, 514 N.E.2d at 866. 
150 Cantave, 993 N.E.2d at 1260. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
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to protect himself.153 
VII. CONCLUSION 
People v. Cantave presented an issue of first impression in 
New York: whether questions concerning the underlying facts of an 
unrelated, pending matter unduly prejudice a defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  Questions of this 
type clearly present major roadblocks in ensuring that criminal-
defendants are provided with a fair trial.  Federal and state case law 
support this contention by providing strong persuasive authority that 
it would be unduly prejudicial to allow questions concerning pending 
criminal matters.  Moreover, employing both the federal and state ap-
proaches, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that a convic-
tion on appeal can still be changed and, therefore, must be treated as 
pending.  The Fifth Amendment was created to ensure that citizens 
would not be compelled to testify against themselves, thereby aiding 
in their own prosecution.  To further safeguard the constitutional 
privilege, it is necessary for the courts to weigh the prosecutor’s duty 
to seek justice for the defendant’s Privilege and his right to testify on 
his own behalf.  Both are invaluable rights that require protection.  In 
Cantave, while the prosecution may have asked questions regarding 
the rape conviction, the fact that the rape conviction was still pending 
should have negated that ability because there is clearly an unfair 
prejudicial effect that the defendant would be hard-pressed to over-
come.  Therefore, the New York Court of Appeals decision in 
Cantave ensures that the criminal defendant is provided with a fair 
trial, free from the threat of self-incrimination and falls within the 
purview and reasoning of its prior decisions as well as the Supreme 
Court’s prior Fifth Amendment decisions regarding the self-
incrimination privilege. 
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